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proved inadequate the city decided to issue electric revenue anticipation bonds to complete the project and to refund 80% of the
general obligation warrants. The court held that since the refunding
was to be made solely from the revenue of the electric system,
issuance of such bonds would not violate the debt provision of the
constitution. Fuller v. City of Cullman, 248 Ala. 236, 27 So. 2d 203
(1946).
In the principal case the court was not confronted with a situation demanding great extension of the language of the constitutional
debt provisions. The money advanced was expended for purposes
properly considered a part of the cost of construction. W. VA. CODE
c. 16, art. 13, § 8 (Michie 1955). The contingencies upon which
repayment was dependent occurred. No obligation to pay other
than from the bond proceeds was placed on the city. In light of
these facts, it seems evident that the court was justified and correct
in its decision.

J. C. W., Jr.
NEcLIGENCE-PNoxrMATE CAUsE-FoRESEEABIY OF SPECIFIC
INJURY.-P, a twelve year old boy, was riding in a truck owned and

driven by his father. As D's truck, coming in the opposite direction,
met and came abreast of the truck in which P was riding, a large
stone lodged between the left rear dual wheels of D's truck was
hurled through the right windshield of the truck in which P was
riding, injuring P. Judgment for P; D appealed. Held, reversing
lower court, that such injury could not be reasonably foreseen
and, negligence was not established which was the proximate cause
of the injury. Miller v. Bolyard, 97 S.E.2d 58 (W. Va. 1957).
No factual precedent was available to the court in deciding
this case. No case in any jurisdiction has previously been reported
involving a rock definitely lodged in the dual wheels of a truck.
In a closely related case, a plaintiff was hit by a stone allegedly
lodged between the wheels of defendant's truck. But the plaintiff
could not definitely identify the truck and it was not proved whether
the stone was wedged between the dual wheels. The court ruled
out negligence and decided the case on the ground of the inapplicability of absolute liability. Randall v. Shelton, 293 S.W.2d
559 (Ky. 1956). Other cases have involved rocks, gravel, slag, bricks,
boards, and other objects lying on the road which have been run
over and thrown by vehicle wheels, but liability and negligence
have usually been determined on the basis of the speed of the
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vehicle and the driver's knowledge of the presence of such objects on
the road. For a discussion and collection of such cases, see Annot.,
115 A.L.R. 1948 (1938) and 1 Negl. & Comp. Cas. Ann. 3d 85
(1953).
The case confirms the oft stated rule that proximate cause is a
requisite for actionable negligence. That such a rule is a fixture in
West Virginia is indicated by the large number of recent cases
cited by the court in the principal case.
Whether any negligence actually existed in the present case is
a matter of conjecture. The fact is emphasized that negligence did
not exist which was the proximate cause of the injury. This suggests the possibility that negligence did exist which was not the
proximate cause of the injury.
It is stated that the defendant was not negligent unless operation of the truck with the stone wedged in the dual wheels constituted negligence. This statement is then negated by evidence
that an injury to persons or property on or near the highway could
not be reasonably foreseen in the manner in which the truck was
operated even if the driver knew the rock was between the wheels.
"Foreseeability does not mean that the precise hazard or the
exact consequences which were encountered should have been foreseen. Upon this all are agreed, whether they regard foreseeability
as relevant only to the duty issue, or to questions of proximate
cause as well." 2 HAPER AND J~Ams, TORTs § 20.5 (1956). (Emphasis added.) This seemingly well-settled rule has thus far been
given only token recognition by the West Virginia court, although
discussions of foreseeability have been frequent and numerous. The
prime requisite of foreseeability in this case hinges on the foreseeability of the ordinary, prudent man. However, does the ordinary,
prudent man need to see the exact consequences of his act? In
McClary v. Knight, 73 W. Va. 885, 393, 80 S.E. 866, 869 (1913),
although not expressly mentioning foreseeability, the court quotes
with approval from Davis v. Lumber Co., 164 Ind. 413, 73 N.E. 899
(1905): "It is not necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the exact injury .... It is sufficient if by ordinary care he
should have known that some injury might happen from such
negligence." Whether neglected or forgotten, the rule thus stated
has not since been expressly used. The implied rejection by omission of this rule in recent foreseeability cases in this state places
West Virginia in a seemingly singular minority. For application in
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other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Virginian Ry. v. Viars, 193 F.2d 547
(4th Cir. 1952); Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 808, 51 S.E.2d 250 (1949);
and Frazier v. Cities Service Oil Co., 159 Kan. 655, 157 P.2d 822
(1945). It is submitted that an application of the rule in the principal case, if negligence actually existed, could have reversed its outcome. It seems feasible that the driver of a truck who knows of the
presence of a rock between the dual wheels could reasonably foresee an injury of some kind if the rock is thrown. Through use of
the majority rule, the fact that the injury occurred in an unusual
manner or to an unexpected victim would not absolve the defendant of his negligence.
A modernization or restatement of the rule of foreseeability
and a definite showing of the presence or absence of negligence
would aid in an interpretation of the principal case.
J. S. T.
NEGLiGENCE-REs IPSA LoQuiTur-PossrBLE RELAXATION OF
REQuOEmENToF ExcLusIVE CONTROL IN BOTITLEI-BEvmAGE CASES.-

D, a bottling company, made delivery of six cases of coca-cola to
P's employer, X company. Two of these cases were placed in a
hallway next to a soft-drink vending machine; the other four were
locked in a closet until needed. Y, another employee of X company,
was in charge of stocking the vending machine. P got a bottle from
the machine; immediately uncapped it and drank therefrom. Relying on res ipsa loquitur, she brought an action for personal injuries
sustained from glass particles allegedly contained in the bottled beverage. Held, ". . . [U]nder the rule of res ipsa loquitur, it is
reversible error to instruct the jury to the effect that they should
find for the plaintiff unless they believe that the defendant has
overcome by competent evidence, the inference of negligence."
Rutherford v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 97 S.E.2d 803
(W. Va. 1957).
Our court is here considering the extent of a procedural advantage that a showing of res ipsa loquitur will confer upon a plaintiff. The various jurisdictions are by no means unanimous upon this
point. See Nosssi, ToTs § 43 (2d ed. 1955); 20 MINN. L. REv.
241 (1936). A very few have held that such a showing shifts to
the defendant the burden of proof. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Mattice, 219 Ark. 428, 243 S.W.2d 15 (1951); Jones v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 447 (1936). A somewhat larger group
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